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Settlement Glossary

Herstatt risk

Herstatt risk is the risk in a foreign exchange trade that one party pays away the currency it sold and never receives the currency it bought, named after the German bank whose 1974 failure made the danger famous.

Herstatt risk is the settlement world’s proper noun: a category of risk named after a single afternoon. It denotes the exposure in any foreign exchange trade settled as two separate payments, where a party can pay away the currency it sold and, before receiving the currency it bought, watch its counterparty fail. What is lost is principal, the full value of the trade, which distinguishes it from the smaller costs of delay or replacing a trade at a worse price.

The afternoon in question

Bankhaus Herstatt was a mid-sized Cologne bank that had speculated heavily, and badly, in currency markets. On 26 June 1974 the German supervisor withdrew its licence and forced it into liquidation at 16:30 local time. The hour mattered more than the bank. It was 10:30 in New York: German banking hours were over, American ones had barely begun. Counterparties had paid Deutsche marks into Herstatt in Frankfurt that morning against dollars due in New York that afternoon. Herstatt’s US correspondent suspended payments from the account, and the marks were gone while the dollars never came. Exposures on the failed settlements were estimated around $200 million, and the shock rippled through interbank payment systems well beyond the direct counterparties.

The regulatory afterlife of that afternoon was substantial: before 1974 was out, the G10 central bank governors had created the committee that became the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

The structure of the risk

Herstatt risk is a time-zone problem before it is a credit problem. Two currencies settle in two national payment systems that open and close on different clocks, so one leg almost always achieves settlement finality before the other. The gap can stretch for hours, and a failure inside the gap converts a market relationship into a total loss of principal. Every hour a paid leg waits for its counterpart is settlement risk in its purest form.

The cure is structural too: bind the legs together so neither settles alone. Payment versus payment does exactly that, and CLS has operated it at scale since 2002 for 18 major currencies. But the umbrella has edges, and outside them the 1974 mechanics are intact. The BIS estimated in 2022 that around $2.2 trillion of daily deliverable FX turnover settled without PvP protection, concentrated in the emerging-market currencies that CLS does not cover. Herstatt risk earned its name half a century ago; it has not yet earned retirement.

Common questions

What actually happened at Herstatt in 1974?
On 26 June 1974, German regulators withdrew the banking licence of Bankhaus Herstatt, a Cologne bank with heavy FX losses, and closed it at 16:30 German time, 10:30 in New York. Counterparty banks had already paid Deutsche marks to Herstatt in Frankfurt that morning, expecting US dollars in New York later the same day. Herstatt's New York correspondent suspended dollar payments from its account, and the banks that had paid were left fully exposed on transactions estimated around $200 million.
Is Herstatt risk still a problem today?
Yes, wherever FX settles without payment-versus-payment protection. CLS removed the risk for the 18 currencies and the participants it covers, but BIS analysis of the 2022 triennial survey estimated that around a third of deliverable FX turnover, roughly $2.2 trillion a day, still settled without PvP protection. Emerging-market currencies, which sit outside the CLS umbrella, are where the exposure concentrates.
How is Herstatt risk eliminated?
By making the two legs of the trade conditional on each other, so one cannot settle without the other. That is payment versus payment, implemented at scale by CLS since 2002, and it is the FX version of the broader principle of atomic settlement. Where PvP is unavailable, banks fall back on managing the exposure rather than removing it: bilateral netting, counterparty limits, and timing controls.

Sources

  1. BIS Quarterly Review, Settlement risk in foreign exchange markets and CLS Bank (December 2002)
  2. BIS Quarterly Review, FX settlement risk: an unsettled issue (December 2022)
  3. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, history (BIS)

Last reviewed 2026-07-16

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